With the changes, all serving three-star generals above the rank of Brigadier owe their position to Musharraf. Interestingly, those with political duties, such as Generals Akram, Hafeez and Ehtisham, were largely left out of the promotions ladder. Whether this was done inadvertently or deliberately, it follows a pattern that some new democracies adopted during transitional periods.

The first impact of the high-level Army changes will be on the issue of Pakistan’s transition to civilian rule. Musharraf now holds both the positions of Chief of Army Staff as well as the powerful presidency. Citing the war against terror, he claimed he needed the uniform to succeed in his efforts.

Already, some changes are visibly discernable that can go on to have long-term effects. For example, to keep its grip on power, the establishment created an Intelligence Corps in 1990. This Corps ensured that the same group of officers climbed up the promotion ladder, carrying with them similar ideological leanings, friendships, hostilities and networking with a group of politicians, civil servants, businessmen and bankers. The promotions more or less went with a Major General heading the Military Intelligence before going on to head the ISI. That mould has now been broken.

Following the two assassination attempts against him, Musharraf removed the head of Military Intelligence and appointed his Military Secretary as the new head. This October, as he promoted the head of the ISI to the post of Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Musharraf brought in 10th Corps Commander General Kiani as the new head of ISI. The 10th Corps is extremely important. It is the Corps that strikes when a coup takes place. General Kiyani was replaced with General Satti.

Both these officers are from Punjab — a further break in the mould. There was a perception earlier, whether true or false, that Musharraf, who is Urdu-speaking, was turning to officers of a similar background. That perception is now laid to rest. (The third important social group in the Army hails from the Frontier. It is not known whether any key appointments from this group were made or are planned.)

Both Satti and Kiyani, according to media reports, played a pivotal role in investigating the assassination plan against Musharraf. On the surface, General Ehsan is the only officer from the old intelligence apparatus to have survived in the promotions scale. He is the new Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), and replaces another ISI official, General Aziz. While most people dismiss the office of CJCS as unimportant, it is vital as it sees all secret ciphers and minutes of confidential meetings. It knows exactly what is happening in the country in all the sensitive fields. Knowledge is power and this office is one which does have power — although of a different kind to that of an operational office.

Outgoing CJCS General Aziz was one of the key players in the political battle that led to Musharraf’s successful coup d’etat in October 1999. After 9/11, he was removed from his position as Chief of General Staff, along with two other officers who brought Musharraf to power. In removing the three men who helped his plane land to safety in October 1999, saving his life (and gave him the seat of power), Musharraf re-ignited the traditions of the Mughal rulers of undivided India. They showed a ruthlessness in getting rid of their fathers, sons and brothers in the battle for power. Media reports painted Aziz as ‘‘the most feared’’ who ‘‘Musharraf projected in private sessions with American leaders as the fundo who may take over and reverse their war against the Islamic radicals’’.

The retirement of Aziz took place calmly and in routine. Musharraf tried to placate the ones he relieved from the offices they held. The former hardline head of ISI, General Mahmood, was made head of Fauji Foundation. Rumors are that Aziz will be made President of Azad Kashmir. The coveted post of Vice-Chief of Army Staff went to Corps Commander, Karachi, Lt Gen Ahsan Saleem Hayat. He narrowly survived an assassination attempt by terrorists earlier.

If anything were to happen to Musharraf before December this year, Ahsan would become key to the future direction that Pakistan takes.

Musharraf plays his promotion cards close to his chest. The military prefers promotions by seniority — but few have been times that seniority has won in the chequered history of the country. There is an appointment principle that claims that in the first 18 months, an appointee is dependent and willing to please. After that he must be changed to prevent the boss becoming dependent on him. Obviously, Musharraf would not like to be dependent on anyone in the country, least of all anyone from his core constituency of the military.

(By: Benazir Bhutto, published in The Indian Express, India)