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IN recent weeks, President Bush and his administration
have mounted a spirited defense of his Iraq policy, the
Patriot Act and, especially, a program to wiretap civilians,
often reaching back into American history for precedents to
justify these actions. It is clear that the president
believes that he is acting to protect the security of the
American people. It is equally clear that both his belief
and the executive authority he claims to justify its use
derive from the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001.
A myriad of contested questions are obviously at issue here
— foreign policy questions about the danger posed by Iraq,
constitutional questions about the proper limits on
executive authority, even political questions about the
president's motives in attacking Iraq. But all of those
debates are playing out under the shadow of Sept. 11 and the
tremendous changes that it prompted in both foreign and
domestic policy.
Whether or not we can regard Sept. 11 as history, I would
like to raise two historical questions about the terrorist
attacks of that horrific day. My goal is not to offer
definitive answers but rather to invite a serious debate
about whether Sept. 11 deserves the historical significance
it has achieved.
My first question: where does Sept. 11 rank in the grand
sweep of American history as a threat to national security?
By my calculations it does not make the top tier of the
list, which requires the threat to pose a serious challenge
to the survival of the American republic.
Here is my version of the top tier: the War for
Independence, where defeat meant no United States of
America; the War of 1812, when the national capital was
burned to the ground; the Civil War, which threatened the
survival of the Union; World War II, which represented a
totalitarian threat to democracy and capitalism; the cold
war, most specifically the Cuban missile crisis of 1962,
which made nuclear annihilation a distinct possibility.
Sept. 11 does not rise to that level of threat because,
while it places lives and lifestyles at risk, it does not
threaten the survival of the American republic, even though
the terrorists would like us to believe so.
My second question is this: What does history tell us about
our earlier responses to traumatic events?
My list of precedents for the Patriot Act and government
wiretapping of American citizens would include the Alien and
Sedition Acts in 1798, which allowed the federal government
to close newspapers and deport foreigners during the
"quasi-war" with France; the denial of habeas corpus during
the Civil War, which permitted the pre-emptive arrest of
suspected Southern sympathizers; the Red Scare of 1919,
which emboldened the attorney general to round up leftist
critics in the wake of the Russian Revolution; the
internment of Japanese-Americans during World War II, which
was justified on the grounds that their ancestry made them
potential threats to national security; the McCarthy scare
of the early 1950's, which used cold war anxieties to pursue
a witch hunt against putative Communists in government,
universities and the film industry.
In retrospect, none of these domestic responses to perceived
national security threats looks justifiable. Every history
textbook I know describes them as lamentable, excessive,
even embarrassing. Some very distinguished American
presidents, including John Adams, Abraham Lincoln and
Franklin Roosevelt, succumbed to quite genuine and
widespread popular fears. No historian or biographer has
argued that these were their finest hours.
What Patrick Henry once called "the lamp of experience"
needs to be brought into the shadowy space in which we have
all been living since Sept. 11. My tentative conclusion is
that the light it sheds exposes the ghosts and goblins of
our traumatized imaginations. It is completely
understandable that those who lost loved ones on that date
will carry emotional scars for the remainder of their lives.
But it defies reason and experience to make Sept. 11 the
defining influence on our foreign and domestic policy.
History suggests that we have faced greater challenges and
triumphed, and that overreaction is a greater danger than
complacency.
(The above op-ed first appeared in The New York Times,
USA) |