FEB 4 - Self-exiled former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto was
unable to meet with US President George Bush in Washington
last week, and that means Washington is not ready yet to
dump Gen Musharraf.
According to STRATFOR, the "Feb. 1 meeting that top
Pakistani opposition leader Benazir Bhutto hoped to have
with U.S. President George W. Bush at a prayer breakfast in
Washington did not materialize, even though several media
reports suggested it would take place.
This, says STRATFOR in its news analysis, is an
indication that the Bush administration, despite its
concerns for continuity and stability in Islamabad, is not
about to support any major anti-Musharraf moves at this
time.
However, given that the occasion was the annual National
Prayer Breakfast attended by several thousand dignitaries in
Washington, it is not surprising, says STRATFOR, that Bhutto
failed to get some one-on-one time with the American
president.
Otherwise, continues STRATFOR, Benazir and her party PPP
could have used the political mileage from a meeting with
Bush to enhance its domestic position, and thus to generate
momentum against Musharraf's government.
The influential Texas-based strategic and intelligence forum
STRATFOR notes that "although Washington has
concerns about political continuity in a post-Musharrafian
Pakistan, it needs to push ahead with the war on terrorism
-- and is not interested in rocking the boat at this time.
Besides, Stratfor notes that while Musharraf's domestic position remains
vulnerable, he is not terribly unpopular. "Had the PPP-P
succeeded in creating significant domestic turmoil for
Musharraf, hindering his ability to govern the country, then
Washington's position would be much different. In that case,
though perhaps not Bush, others in his administration would
have been seen meeting with Bhutto and other PPP-P leaders,"
the article observed.
The reality is, STRATFOR continues, that the PPP-P has
been unable to generate a popular movement against Musharraf
for a number of reasons: First, Bhutto has been living in
exile for the past decade. Second, Musharraf has been able
to weaken the party by engineering defections from many of
its parliament members. Third, the government has created
rifts between the PPP-P and its main ally, the Pakistan
Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N), and thus prevented the creation
of a coherent opposition alliance.
STRATFOR says: "Musharraf has sown mistrust between the
government's two principal opponents by leaking information
that officials were engaged in back-channel talks with the
PPP-P about a possible power-sharing deal. Islamabad also
adroitly used the recently passed Women's Protection Bill to
further add to the impression that there would be an
accommodation between the PPP-P and Musharraf. The
government knew the pro-women measure would get PPP-P
support whenever it came up for debate, but timed the vote
on it for shortly after the PPP-P and the PML-N (which
opposes anything that even hints at cooperation with the
government) embarked on a joint program against Musharraf.
By forcing the PPP-P to vote on the measure, Musharraf
managed to get the PML-N to question the viability of
allying with the PPP-P. At the same time, he also prevented
the Islamist bloc, which opposes any liberal reform, from
aligning with the two mainstream parties.
There has been much speculation on all sides, says the
article, regarding the PPP-P's possible course of action
against Musharraf -- and even on whether it actually can do
anything to oust him, given its weakened state and absent
leader. Senior PPP-P leaders recently told STRATFOR,
however, that Bhutto would return to Pakistan once the
government announces an election schedule. One top leader,
however, acknowledged that the party would find it
impossible to launch a popular movement against Musharraf's
government before the elections, though he said a movement
could emerge from an enraged public should the elections be
rigged.
Continuing with their analysis of Pakistan's political
scenario, STRATFOR observes that
"the PPP-P, now out of power for more than a decade, has
been forced not only to participate in elections held by the
government but also to consider negotiating with the
military government. Its leaders, however, remain adamant
that any deal with the government would take place only if
it included a power-sharing arrangement. One PPP-P leader
even suggested that the PPP-P could join its ideological
rival, Islamist alliance Mutahiddah Majlis-i-Amal, in a mass
movement to topple the Musharraf government."
"Domestically, the PPP-P has no good choices. It has been
unable to work out a deal with Musharraf that does not
include de-legitimizing itself, and it faces significant
hurdles to forging a grand alliance with other
anti-Musharraf forces. For now, the PPP-P's position allows
Musharraf the bandwidth to better manage his hold on power,
especially as regards the coming elections. It also puts him
in a strong position to experiment with bargaining with the
PPP-P. Senior leaders from the ruling Pakistan Muslim
League, however, have expressed their discomfort regarding
the moves to cut a deal with the PPP-P, STRATFOR noted.
(-Filed by Irshad Salim) |