The Meltdown and the Future Military Leadership| Oscar-Tango by Irshad Salim

NEW JERSEY, JUN 8 - For the first time since the current political crisis began March 9, President Gen. Musharraf acknowledged June 7 that he is in trouble. His admission that his hold on power is slipping raises significant doubts about his ability to secure a second term in the presidential election slated for the second half of September. It is too early to predict which actor will succeed him politically, but Musharraf's ability (or lack thereof) to win re-election will be a key element in shaping the Pakistani military's future, writes Stratfor in its latest analysis titled, "Pakistan: The Future Military Leadership".

In its earlier analysis, dated June 5 and titled, "The Meltdown of the Musharraf State" the Texas-based influential news intel agency cum think tank put the entire blame of the present miscalculations on President Musharraf's reliance on a small circle of bureaucratic advisers. He is no longer listening to his political allies in the ruling Pakistan Muslim League (PML), it said.

However, not heeding the PML's advice might not have major consequences, since it is the party that is dependent on Musharraf for its position of power, says Stratfor. But the COAS-President is critically dependent on the military's support to ensure his regime's continuity. This is why Musharraf on June 1 called an emergency meeting of the corps commanders and army's agency heads, during which the top generals reportedly expressed complete support for the president, the article adds.

Addressing lawmakers from the ruling coalition PML(Q) on June 7, embattled Gen. Musharraf warned that a change in the political order would be disastrous for the country. He also blamed his parliamentarian supporters for abandoning him in the ongoing crisis, adding that he is constantly receiving reports about what they are saying privately. He also criticized them for not publicly supporting him, and said he will question their utility if he must deal with everything himself.

Gen. Musharraf's complaint coincided with Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz's observations made the same day, according to GEO TV, that some members of the ruling Pakistan Muslim League were either conspiring with the opposition or remaining quiet about the ongoing political crisis in the country.

There was also an unexpected delay on June 7 in the airing of his pre-recorded address to the nation. It remains unclear whether it was a temporary delay or if the broadcast has been postponed, and the reason for the postponement.

The implementation of tight restrictions which were imposed on Pakistani TV broadcasters a couple of days earlier was also suspended on June 7until a committee composed of three media heads and three government representatives reviews the decree. According to one report, it was PM Shaukat Aziz, and Senator Mushahid Hussain who convinced the General to withdraw the new restrictions or be ready to face more street demonstrations.

PML(Q) President Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain on Friday complained to Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz that the party had been ignored in decision making including filing of the presidential reference against Chief Justice Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhry, Daily Times reported citing sources.

According to some observers, Shujaat and several other party stalwarts have been seen distancing themselves lately from Gen. Musharraf and are on record taking stands against his moves.

According to Stratfor's latest analysis, the General's first admission of concern since the political crisis began March 9 -- show that his regime is buckling under the weight of the crisis, which has created serious fissures within the civilian side of the hybrid Musharrafian political system.

Infighting among his allies -- upon whom he depends to secure a second presidential term -- and the rapidly intensifying unrest in the country raise serious doubts about his ability to win the next presidential election, scheduled for the second half of September, the analysis says. "If the president cannot win re-election, he could try to impose an emergency rule of sorts, but that would only exacerbate matters".

When Musharraf cannot seek re-election, continues the analysis, his generals likely will force him to throw in the towel, and a caretaker government, whose main task will be holding fresh parliamentary polls, will be created.

The Texas-based think tank's article however notes that it is too early to predict which political force will form the next government, since a number of elements are in play. Whatever happens to Musharraf politically, the composition of Pakistan's military -- with or without Musharraf -- is relatively easier to discern, the article notes.

The article also echoes the common observation that Musharraf not only wants to get re-elected as president, but he also wants to do so while holding onto the position of military chief. But, says Stratfor, this is because he wants to oversee the forthcoming round of promotions and retirements in order to build the right team to ensure his hold on power -- a step that would be an absolute necessity if Musharraf later caves to domestic pressure and steps down as military chief.

Continuing with its observations on Pakistan's current affairs, the news intel agency adds that the military deck is scheduled to undergo a routine reshuffle in the first week of October. The most prominent change to come is the retirement of Musharraf's two senior-most subordinates: Vice Chief of the Army Staff (VCOAS) Gen. Ahsan Saleem Hayat and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (CJCSC) Gen. Ehsan ul-Haq. Currently, these two are the only four-star generals besides Musharraf himself. If he wins re-election in September, Musharraf's priority will be to fill the vacant positions, says the analysis. "This process will bring to the fore younger generals, among whom there are a number of possible candidates based on merit and seniority, as well as on personal ties to Musharraf" -

Lt. Gen. Tariq Majeed: commander of the 10th Corps, who is considered to be the most capable among all the corps commanders, and who is the front-runner for the No. 2 position of VCOAS
Lt. Gen. Ashfaq Pervez Kiyani: director-general of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and another senior general who could be appointed to the No. 3 post, the CJCSC
Lt. Gen. Salahuddin Satti: current chief of the General Staff who, though a bit junior to other generals, could be moved to a key position
Lt. Gen. Muhammad Yousaf: current vice chief of the General Staff, who also could be appointed to a critical position

"While effecting promotions and appointments, he would want to make sure that his own position is not threatened, especially given the growing movement to oust him from power. Moreover, should he need to step down as military chief and become a civilian president, he would want the next military chief to be beholden to him. This involves not just loyalty but also the creation of dependency. Therefore, he could go beyond the top tier of generals and elevate others, such as 4th Corps Commander Lt. Gen. Shafaatullah Shah, Quarter Master General Lt. Gen. Afzal Muzaffar or 30th Corps Commander Lt. Gen. Waseem Ahmed Ashraf. Director-General of Military Intelligence Maj-Gen. Nadeem Ejaz could also become a three-star general and be made director-general of the ISI."

However, according to the agency, there is a downside to filling the top slots with second-tier commanders. "These generals are inexperienced in political matters, especially in situations like the current crisis. Therefore, they are more likely to press Musharraf to step down if the existing situation escalates, especially with political forces mobilizing for the parliamentary polls slated for November."

Considering the pace and magnitude of the anti-Musharraf movement's growth, it is becoming increasingly unlikely that Musharraf can win re-election, the article observes. "Once Musharraf realizes that an election victory is beyond his reach, he could attempt to impose emergency rule as a means of prolonging his hold on power. This will only accelerate the unrest and lead to the point at which his generals will likely have to force him to quit".

In its earlier analysis, dated June 5, and captioned " The Meltdown of the Musharraf State", the author commented that "when the generals know things have reached a point of no return, they will act; this could happen before the end of summer depending on how fast events progress."

If Musharraf is forced to step down, the latest analysis draws the following scenario:

"Though he is the army chief, Musharraf has not had time to oversee the day-to-day running of the military because of his duties as a president -- especially as a president who has had to deal with an extraordinary number of domestic and foreign policy issues. As a result, Hayat has been running the military on Musharraf's behalf and could easily step into the role of military chief.

But the task of removing the increasingly unpopular Musharraf -- especially since Hayat is due to retire -- would make the process very complicated, to say the least. Furthermore, Hayat is known to be mild-mannered, which makes him unlikely to initiate Musharraf's removal. Instead, a consensus among corps commanders and certain key agency heads would be required.

This is where the other four-star general, Ehsan-ul-Haq, who has served as head of the military's two intelligence directorates, could play an important role. However, Ehsan-ul-Haq's position is ceremonial, so he does not have the authority to get the ball rolling or even secure a position in a post-Musharraf military leadership. This makes the role of the corps commanders -- who already are key because they are in command of the troops -- all the more important.

From the seniority standpoint, Majeed and Kiyani would be the key deciding players, while Satti and commander of the Mangla-based 1st Corps Lt. Gen. Sajjad Akram would be the prominent players from a logistical standpoint. At the end of the day, a consensus would be needed among the three-star generals, who likely would back Hayat to succeed Musharraf as army chief and get a three-year extension, thereby avoiding his scheduled retirement.

Hayat's first order of business as military chief would be to work with the political forces and the civilian establishment to install an acting president and caretaker government headed by an interim prime minister, which would hold parliamentary elections within 90 days. Though Hayat would not inherit Musharraf's political powers, he would be the one to oversee the reshuffle of the military deck, at which point every position aside from his own would be up for grabs. That said, those who would have played leading roles in the removal of Musharraf will be the ones most likely to assume key posts in the post-Musharraf military hierarchy.

After Musharraf's departure from the helm, regardless of how and when that happens, the military is unlikely to continue to directly run the country. Moreover, because of the assertiveness of the judiciary and the media, and an increasingly vibrant civil society, the military will have to give the civilian setup more freedom than it did in 1988, when military rule came to an end after military-chief-cum-president Mohammed Zia-ul-Haq died in a mysterious plane crash. But, for the foreseeable future, the military will continue to maintain a strong hold over the state -- partly because it is the most disciplined and professional institution in the country."